A defendant was charged with one count of transmission of an interstate threat to injure or kill another person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), based on an online comment stating, "I wish someone would in alive him." The indictment did not specify where the comment was posted, to whom it was communicated, or identify the referenced individual.

According to a search warrant affidavit, the "him" referred to United States District Court Judge John L. Badalamenti, who on June 22, 2025, contacted the United States Marshals Service (USMS) for the Middle District of Florida about a threat linked to reactions to a June 21, 2025, New York Times article titled "A White Nationalist Wrote a Law School Paper Promoting Racist Views, It won Him an Award." Judge Badalamenti is an adjunct professor at the University of Florida and taught a seminar on originalism in fall 2024. The article discussed a student's paper arguing that the Constitution's framers intended "We the People" to refer exclusively to white people.

USMS and Judge Badalamenti suspected the phrase "in alive him" was a typographical error for "unalive him," implying a threat to kill. However, the court dismissed the indictment, concluding as a matter of law that the post did not constitute a true threat under the statute.

The defendant argued that merely wishing or hoping harm would come to another does not fall within the scope of § 875(c). The Third Circuit acknowledged that a wish could constitute a threat in the right context but found that a reasonable jury could interpret the defendant's statement as preparation to commit harm. Nonetheless, the court referenced precedent indicating that statements lacking a declaration or indication of intent to act do not amount to threats. For example, a 1945 case held that saying someone "should or ought to kill the President" without intent does not constitute a threat. Similarly, a 2011 case affirmed dismissal of an indictment where a statement was hypothetical and conditional, not threatening bodily harm to any individual.

This case highlights the legal complexities in distinguishing protected speech from punishable threats under federal law.

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